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Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on the geographical representativeness of party lists. It examines 
which party- and electoral system-related attributes explain the variation in that response 
variable. By doing so, this contribution seeks to improve our understanding of the 
geographical dynamics of intraparty candidate selection processes. 
Electoral systems are often evaluated on the basis of their ability to translate election results 
into legislatures that reflect the composition of society. In proportional systems, we expect 
vote shares to be accurately translated into seat shares. In addition, members of parliament 
should also be a representative sample of society, for instance in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
age and geography. This argument stems from the theory of descriptive representation, which 
posits that a political institution must mirror the image of society to be viewed as legitimate 
by all segments of society (Pitkin, 1967; Birch, 1993).  
Of the personal traits mentioned in the previous paragraph, the geography of MPs and 
candidates is definitely one of the under-researched topics. By contrast, scholars have 
extensively studied the representation of women and ethnic minorities in parliaments (Htun, 
2004; Norris, 2004). Moreover, it has been well-documented why parties in proportional 
systems are inclined to balance their ticket to include women and ethnic minority groups 
among their candidates (Matland, 1993).  
With regard to the geographical background of MPs and candidates, we know that the large 
majority of electoral systems work with electoral districts to ensure geographical 
representation in parliament. But even electoral systems with a single national constituency 
produce geographically representative parliaments (Latner and McGann, 2005). While it was 
clear that political parties played an important role in realizing geographical representation 
within the nationwide districts, it has not been examined how they achieved that result. Some 
authors claim that their internal candidate selection methods recognize the importance of 
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regionalism, and force party selectorates to produce geographically representative party lists 
(Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; Hazan, 1997). 
This paper attempts to shed more light on the determinants of geographical representation on 
party lists and within districts. The question I try to tackle, is the following: which electoral 
system-related and party-related variables influence this outcome at the district (i.e. party list) 
level? A dataset was built on the place of residence of candidates on 488 party lists for seven 
elections of the Belgian Lower House (1987-2010). Two measures of geographical 
representation at the party list level will be used as outcome variables in the empirical 
analysis.  
Belgium is a case where geography is strongly embedded in the political culture: it is a federal 
system combining territorial and non-territorial substate levels, with separate party systems 
and strong regional identities. Therefore, it is an interesting case to analyze geographical 
dynamics of candidate selection processes. In addition, recent electoral reforms have 
significantly increased district magnitude and the level of gender representation through the 
introduction of quota laws, creating variation in key independent variables mentioned in the 
literature. 
A general theory of ticket-balancing 
Ticket-balancing implies that parties present a balanced group of candidates in terms of their 
background characteristics. With regard to the geographical background of candidates, this 
means that party selectorates nominate candidates living in various areas in the district, 
instead of a geographically more concentrated group. If this is indeed a primary concern for 
parties, the place of residence of aspirant-candidates becomes one of the candidate selection 
criteria.  
However, a reading of the literature on the political representation of ethnic groups and 
women suggests that the importance of balancing tickets depends on the electoral system type 
and district magnitude, defined as the number of seats per district (Matland, 2005). In 
majoritarian systems, where district magnitude usually equals one, parties do not even have 
the chance to balance their ticket. They nominate only one candidate, and pursue the strategy 
of selecting a lowest common denominator (Tremblay, 2012), i.e. that particular candidate 
with the broadest electoral appeal. This maximizes the odds of winning a majority of votes 
and consequently the seat. In proportional systems, on the other hand, district magnitude is 
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considerably higher, and parties could win multiple seats in the district. In other words, party 
magnitude (defined as the number of seats a party wins in the district) increases, which 
implies that parties are able to divide their winning slots or realistic list positions among 
candidates from various social groups. 
Parties in proportional systems thus have the theoretical possibility to balance their ticket, and 
will be inclined to do so for both electoral and organisational reasons (Gallagher and Marsh, 
1988; Norris, 2004; Valdini, 2012). From the electoral perspective, the exclusion of any major 
social group could signal discrimination, which could result into an electoral penalty at the 
ballot box (Norris, 2006). The ticket-balancing strategy also makes sense from a party 
cohesion perspective: balancing the slate avoids internal conflict between party factions 
(Norris, 1997). 
The ticket-balancing process is often considered a crucial factor affecting women’s presence 
in parliaments and on party lists (Matland and Studlar, 1996). But the exact nature of this 
process, and the actual number of women getting elected, depends on the configuration of 
three elements: ballot structure, district and party magnitude. First, ballot structure determines 
which part of the candidate list should be balanced to guarantee the election of women 
candidates. In closed list systems, where the specific rank order of candidates on the list 
determines who gets elected, parties have to put women in one of the top positions on the list 
(Marsh, 2005). In open list proportional systems, only the voters decide who will get elected 
by casting preference votes for one or more candidates on the list. In this case, the specific 
position of women candidates on the list is less important (see, however: Miller and Krosnick, 
1988). Finally, in the more hybrid list PR systems where both rank order and preference votes 
come into play (e.g. flexible list systems), it is important to have female candidates in winning 
slots as well as on the list in its entirety.  
Second, the higher the district magnitude, the higher the absolute number of list slots and thus 
the available space to present a balanced group of candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995; see, 
however: Crisp, Jensen, and Shomer, 2007). This positive association between district 
magnitude and list positions is a crucial element in the ticket-balancing mechanism: a long list 
of candidates allows parties to include all relevant social groups on the ballot (Lovenduski 
and Norris, 1993; Norris, 1997). Consequently, any type of research on the relation between 
district magnitude and geographical representation should take into account the number of list 
slots. The third and final element, party magnitude, determines whether these groups have a 
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realistic chance of getting elected to parliament. If a party expects to win only one seat in the 
district, the candidate selection process becomes a winner takes all event, thereby making 
ticket-balancing purely cosmetic (Young, 1994). 
While this discussion of the ticket-balancing process largely focuses on gender representation, 
I argue that the same mechanisms work for geographical representation. Higher district and 
party magnitude increases the chances of seeing candidates living in both urbanized and rural 
areas on the party list and elected to parliament.  
But even in the most ideal institutional setup, there is no absolute guarantee that parties will 
actually balance their ticket. In fact, some parties might still prefer to nominate a very 
homogenous group of candidates, without actually getting electorally punished or creating 
intraparty turmoil. If those parties’ electoral support is largely concentrated, they will be less 
inclined to balance the ticket. Ethnic parties, for example, will mainly draw candidates from 
their own ethnic minority group since they are not interested in drawing support from other 
social groups (Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar, 2010).  
Applying this argument to geographical representation means that parties with geographically 
concentrated support will be less likely to produce geographically balanced tickets. Parties 
with geographically dispersed support, however, will put some effort in selecting candidates 
from various areas. In the next section, I derive a number of independent variables from the 
literature, and discuss their expected effects on the level of geographical representation on 
party lists. 
Independent variables and hypotheses 
District magnitude has already been discussed as an important predictor for the level of 
representation in parliaments and on party lists. In general, district magnitude is positively 
correlated with both the number of list slots and party magnitude, which means that both list 
space and multiple winning slots are available to get candidates from various social groups 
elected to parliament. The literature states that minority groups will have higher levels of 
political representation in larger districts (Matland, 1993). 
In terms of geographical representation, this would imply that district magnitude has a 
positive effect on the representation of geographic minority groups. I argue that candidates 
from small municipalities perform the minority role. In general, party selectorates will be 
more inclined to nominate candidates from the larger and middle-sized municipalities of the 
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district: those candidates share their place of residence with a larger proportion of voters 
which makes them electorally more attractive, and they resort on more resourceful grassroots 
organizations than candidates from the smallest municipalities. But this latter group does 
stand a chance of getting nominated in the largest districts: as district magnitude (DM) 
increases, the number of list positions increases as well, and parties will be more willing to 
allocate list slots to geographical minority groups. This leads to the first hypothesis of this 
paper: 
H1. An increase in DM leads to higher levels of geographical representation on party lists. 
As mentioned earlier, even electoral systems with favorable conditions for balanced tickets 
will have parties with no interest in ticket-balancing efforts. Recent research shows that there 
is not only strong variation in the importance attached to descriptive representation, but also 
in terms of the prioritized social dimension, for which there seems to be a left-right divide 
(Caramani, Celis, and Wauters, 2014). Arguably, one could measure party efforts by using 
one form of social group representation as predictor of another form. Put differently, if a party 
list scores high in terms of the representation of women, it could be expected that they also 
perform better in terms of geographical representation.  
This argument stems from a strong claim in the literature that various forms of social group 
representation are positively associated (Taagepera, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). The idea is that the 
same factors contribute to higher levels of gender and ethnic representation, mainly the 
electoral system in place, candidate supply and cultural factors (Dahlerup, 2013). While these 
authors focus on parliamentary representation, this association might also hold true for party 
lists. Controlling for electoral system type and district magnitude, the level of gender 
representation might be positively associated with geographical representation. In other 
words, if party selectorates invest in representational politics and find it important to reflect 
society on party lists, geographical representation will go hand in hand with the presence of 
women candidates: 
H2a. The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are positively 
associated. 
There has not been a lot of convincing empirical evidence for this argument. Based on a 
dataset comprising 95 countries, Ruedin (2010) found no positive association between levels 
of gender and ethnic group representation. However, the author did not find a negative 
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correlation either, indicating that it is not the case that increasing levels of representation in 
one form might come at the cost of another. One could, however, make the argument that it 
does: strong fixation on the representation of one social group may impede the representation 
of other groups. The literature points to possible tensions between gender and minority group 
representation (Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar, 2010; Rahat and Malka, 2012). As a result, an 
alternative hypothesis is formulated: 
H2b. The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are negatively 
associated. 
Another relevant covariate is the nature of the parties’ candidate selection methods. The most 
useful analytical framework for comparative analysis of candidate selection methods has been 
developed by Hazan and Rahat (2001; 2010). Their model disentangles four dimensions of 
candidate selection, among which selectorate and decentralization are the most important. The 
selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects the candidates, and can be composed of 
only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate. This dimension can be 
measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, where a very limited group of selectors 
take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as party members or the electorate. 
Decentralization, on the other hand, measures the influence of local party branches in 
candidate selection. In the most centralized methods, the national party level has complete 
control over the nomination process. 
There has been some research attention to the effects of candidate selection methods on 
political representation (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Spies and Kaiser (2014) find that the 
representativeness of parties towards their voters in terms of left-right position is lower in 
candidate selection methods with more inclusive selectorates. Another interesting result is that 
parties with highly inclusive candidate selection methods produce lists with lower levels of 
demographic representation. Rahat, Hazan, and Katz (2008) find that selection methods with 
membership ballots are less likely to produce candidate lists with women on safe positions. 
Highly exclusive methods, on the contrary, lead to highly representative sets of candidates. 
The underlying reason is the difference in the fundamental nature of the task confronting 
selectors in membership ballots vis-à-vis exclusive party committees. In membership ballots, 
on the one hand, members are asked after their individual preferences about party candidates. 
Selectors in party committees, on the other hand, are more inclined to base their decision on 
an evaluation of the collective good of the party. In addition, membership ballots will also 
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lead to unbalanced candidate lists because the actions of such a vast selectorate are more 
difficult to coordinate than the actions of party committees with a limited number of selectors. 
Following this argument, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3. Exclusive candidate selection methods lead to higher levels of geographical 
representation on party lists. 
The link between decentralization of candidate selection methods and the level of 
geographical representation on candidate lists seems more straightforward. According to 
Hazan and Rahat (2010), this relationship is positive because ‘if more power in the candidate 
selection process is given to the regional and/or the local selectorates, at the expense of the 
national party organization, the likely result will be more candidates chosen who represent the 
regional and local levels.’ In other words, it is argued that candidates selected by a 
decentralized, regional or local selectorate, will be more geographically representative than 
candidates selected by national party selectorates. 
H4. Decentralized candidate selection methods lead to higher levels of geographical 
representation on party lists. 
The case of Belgium 
The Belgian electoral system is often characterized as a flexible list system, where voters are 
able to endorse the party list as a whole or to cast one or multiple preference votes for party 
candidates on the same list (Shugart, 2005). In theory, both list order and the number of 
preference votes play an important role in intraparty seat allocation. In practice, however, the 
threshold of preference votes to overcome the list order is reached very infrequently, which 
led scholars to characterize flexible list systems as closed-list systems in disguise (Crisp, et 
al., 2013). In recent years, the Belgian system has experienced a number of important 
electoral reforms that created variation in the key independent variables examined in this 
paper. 
First, district magnitude has increased substantially over the last two decades. As part of the 
fourth Belgian state reform in 1993, the number of electoral districts decreased from 30 to 20. 
This was a consequence of the decision to reduce the number of seats in the lower House from 
212 to 150. As a result of these reforms, the average district magnitude increased from 5 to 
7.5. As part of a second electoral district reform in 2002, the number of districts decreased a 
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second time from 20 to 11. Table 1 presents a number of descriptive statistics on the evolution 
of district magnitude for the election of the Belgian lower House. 
< Table 1 about here > 
The table shows that the Belgian case is a good example of the positive, but not completely 
linear association between district magnitude and the number of list positions (Crisp, Jensen 
and Shomer, 2007). The introduction of larger districts clearly led to higher numbers of list 
positions. To some extent, this gave parties additional space to keep nominating candidates 
from both large and small municipalities. However, this should not be exaggerated: in both 
reforms the increase in the average list length was lower than the increase in the average 
district magnitude. In 1992, the average district magnitude increased by a ratio of 1.5 (7.5/5) 
and the average list length by a ratio of 1.1 (13.3/12.2). As a result, the net effect would still 
be a decrease in the number of candidates per seat.1 Figure 1 visualizes these reforms.  
< Figure 1 about here > 
In some Belgian parties, local party branches feared that these electoral reforms would make 
it more difficult for small municipality candidates to gain campaign visibility (Pilet, 2007). As 
elections would be organized on a higher scale in enlarged districts, the candidates from the 
largest cities of these districts would dominate election campaigns. This argument is at odds 
with the theoretical claim that district magnitude is in fact positively associated with political 
representation. 
A second relevant electoral reform in Belgium was the introduction of candidate gender 
quotas. The first Belgian quota law was introduced in 1994 and first applied in the 1999 
elections. It stated that no more than two thirds of the candidates on party lists could be of the 
same sex. In 2002, this law was adapted in the sense that party lists should from then on 
include an equal number of male and female candidates. In addition, at least one of the top 
three positions on the party list should be reserved for women. Right before the election of 
2007, this was again adapted to at least one woman in the two top positions.  
After the introduction of candidate gender quotas, all Belgian parties were legally bound to 
nominate a sufficient number of women candidates on their party lists, and afterwards even in 
the winning slots. This substantially increased both the number of women candidates on 
realistic list positions and the number of female MPs in the Lower House (from 7.7% in 1987 
to 38.5% in 2010).  
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Third, Belgian candidate selection methods have varied considerably over the last decades. 
Various Belgian parties have employed highly inclusive selection methods over the last 
decades, allowing their members to participate in the process. The Flemish and Walloon 
Christian-Democrats, for example, have frequently been using a system of member polls: 
party members had the possibility to ratify or reject a model list drafted earlier by more 
exclusive party agencies (De Winter, 1988). Furthermore, the Flemish liberals introduced a 
highly inclusive system of primaries in the 1990s, which gave the opportunity to registered 
voters to nominate candidates for parliamentary elections (Verleden, 2013).  
Other parties used methods that involved party delegates. Since they are appointed by the 
members, these delegates can be seen as an indirect inclusion of party members in the 
selection process. The Flemish Socialists, for example, applied selection methods where the 
lists were ratified by an assembly of member delegates. But also the Flemish Christian-
Democrats used these assemblies for the first three elections included in the analysis 
(Deschouwer, 1993).  
Finally, there are also examples of highly exclusive selection methods, where no members or 
member delegates are involved in any way. The Walloon liberal party MR is a good example 
of this category: only the presidents of the various party components were entitled to appoint 
the most important candidates on the party lists, and in a final step approve the entire 
candidate lists (Vandeleene, et al., 2013). 
But also in terms of centralization, there was considerable variation among Belgian parties 
between 1987 and 2010. The Flemish liberal party, for example, has a strong tradition of 
keeping the role of the national party level very limited. In other cases, candidate lists are the 
result of an interaction between party agencies at the district and national party level. A 
typical example are the selection methods applied by the Flemish Christian-Democrats: after a 
party agency at the district level took the initiative of drafting a first list proposal, a national 
party agency could either modify or ratify this list, before it was presented to the members 
through a poll.  
Centralization was highest where the national party level had veto right in the final step of the 
selection process. In 2003 and 2007, the Walloon Christian-Democrats organized a candidate 
selection procedure where a national party committee with a limited number of members 
could approve the model list drafted by the district organization, or simply overrule the 
decisions made at the district level and draft a completely different proposal. 
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Data, measurements and method 
I constructed a dataset on the place of residence of Belgian party candidates for all the 
elections of the Lower House since 1987.2 These data on candidates from 488 party lists was 
used to calculate the level of geographical representation on the lists. The dataset contains 
information on candidates from eight Belgian parties: the Christian-democrats, liberals, 
socialists and green parties of the Walloon and Flemish regions of Belgium. The criterion for 
selecting these parties was their level of institutionalization and whether they have been 
represented continually in parliament.3  
One of the key issues to deal with is of course how to measure the level of geographical 
representation on party lists. I consider a party list to be geographically representative when it 
includes candidates from the highest possible number of municipalities. This will be measured 
by means of municipality-indicator ܯ݅: 
ܯ݅ = 	 ௥ܰ
௧ܰ
 
where ௥ܰ is the number of municipalities represented on the party list, and ௧ܰ is the total 
number of municipalities in the district. In other words, this indicator calculates the proportion 
of municipalities represented on the party lists. The higher the score, the higher the territorial 
coverage of the district in terms of party candidates.  
This measure of geographical representation does not take into account list positions. Rank 
order remains an important determinant of the candidate’s odds of getting elected in the 
Belgian flexible list system. There might be substantial differences between the level of 
geographical representation on the party list in its entirety on the one hand, and the realistic 
positions on the other. As a result, a second indicator focuses on the realistic list slots. More 
specifically, it measures the proportion of candidates of the largest municipality on the 
realistic list slots: 
ܴ௜ = 1 −	ܴ௟௠ܴ௡  
Where ܴ௟௠ is the number of candidates of the largest municipality on a realistic place, and ܴ௡ 
is the total number of realistic places on the party list. In other words, this indicator focuses on 
the dominance of large city candidates: the higher the proportion of large city candidates in 
realistic slots, the lower the geographical representativeness of the list. I take the inverse of 
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this proportion for reasons of interpretation: higher proportions of large city candidates 
decreases the representativeness and the value of this indicator. 
In practice, Belgian party selectorates distinguish between realistic and non-realistic positions 
on the list, using previous election results as benchmarks (Put and Maddens, 2013). For 
example, if a party won three seats in a district during the previous election, the first four 
positions could be considered realistic: the candidate on the fourth positions stands a real 
chance of being elected on the condition that his or her number of preference votes is high 
enough and/or the party realizes a significant upward swing in the district. In addition, the 
Belgian case has known many examples of the candidate at the bottom of the list managing to 
get elected instead of a higher ranked candidate (Wauters, Weekers, and Pilet, 2004). This is 
so because parties often choose popular politicians for this final position. For these reasons, 
the ‘list pusher’ will also be considered a realistic position in the analysis. Finally, the first 
substitute candidate is also included in the category of realistic list positions, since this is a list 
slot with a realistic possibility of getting a seat in the event of resignation, death or a 
ministerial office for one of the other elected MPs on the list. 
These two indicators both focus on the municipality level as the relevant geographical unit, 
and this for two substantial reasons. First, the municipality level is the lowest organizational 
unit within Belgian political parties and could still be seen as building stones of their party 
organizations (Deschouwer and Rihoux, 2008). They perform the crucial task of recruiting 
talented aspirant-candidates. Second, politicians’ local ties are usually perceived in terms of 
previous political experience at the municipal level (Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2014). 
District magnitude (DM) is measured by the number of seats per district. In the multivariate 
analyses, I use the logarithm of DM to control for the influence of outliers, since the natural 
DM in the dataset ranges from 2 to 24. I will also control for the average number of list slots 
per municipality, which is a relative measure of the number of list positions. This variable 
summarizes the scarcity of list slots compared to the number of municipalities in the district, 
and expresses the level of competition among the various municipalities in the district to get 
at least one list slot.  
The level of gender representation on party lists is measured by the proportion of female 
candidates in realistic list slots. As a result of the introduction of quota laws, this proportion 
will generally increase over the seven Lower House elections under investigation. However, 
by using this measure, I control for substantial differences between party lists within 
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elections. For example, while parties were not legally required to nominate 50% of female 
candidates before 2003, the Flemish green party already reached this threshold in 1995 
(Maddens et al., 2014).  
To estimate the effect of intraparty candidate selection methods, I work with selection indexes 
measuring the dimensions of selectorate and decentralization on an ordinal scale. While 
earlier studies have used  integrated 6-point and 8-point scales amalgamating these two 
dimensions (Shomer, 2009; Shomer, 2014), I use two separate scales to test the distinct effects 
of inclusiveness and decentralization on the response variables. Data on Belgian candidate 
selection methods were collected on the basis of party regulations, interviews with party 
officials, news articles and existing literature on the topic. 
< Figure 2 about here > 
The level of inclusiveness of Belgian candidate selection methods is measured on a 3-point 
scale. The highest level on this scale are selection methods where members are directly 
involved, for example by ratifying the model lists that have been drafted by one of the party 
agencies. The middle category on this scale are the selection methods where party members 
appoint delegates. The most exclusive category are procedures where members or delegates 
are not involved in any way, but one or more non-selected party agencies dominate the 
selection process. 
< Figure 3 about here > 
I constructed a similar 3-point scale for measuring the level of decentralization. The highest 
score on the scale is for selection methods where the constituency organization has full 
autonomy in drafting the list. If, however, the selection process takes the form of an 
interaction between the national and district level, the observation fits the second category on 
the index. The most centralized procedure is when the national party level controls the final 
step of the selection process and/or has the chance to overrule any previous decisions taken at 
a lower party level.  
Finally, two control variables will be added to the analysis: the relative number of realistic 
slots on the party list, and the relative size of the largest city in the district. A large number of 
realistic list positions increases the available space on the list to balance the ticket, and should 
be taken into account. The second control variable is especially important when modelling ܴ݅: 
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self-evidently, the larger the largest city in the district, the more realistic slots will be assigned 
to candidates from that city. 
Finally, both dependent variables ܯ݅ and	ܴ௜ are proportions, which means that both the 
assumptions of continuous scores and normality are violated. The classical solution to this 
problem is to perform a logit transformation to achieve normality, followed by OLS 
regression. The following transformation is applied:4	 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ	(ܴ݅) = 	 ln( ܴ݅1 − ܴ݅) 
In addition, there are several reasons to believe that the 488 party lists in the dataset are not 
independent observations. First, these are party lists from seven subsequent elections, creating 
the possibility that there might be a time effect involved which is not measured by other 
independent variables. Second, the eight political parties included in the dataset belong to four 
different ideological families. As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, party ideology 
might play an important role in determining what type of representation is prioritized on the 
party list. As a result, to avoid omitted variable bias in the multivariate analysis, I add fixed-
effects for elections and party family to the models.  
Results 
What determines geographical representation on party lists? Table 2 first summarizes some 
descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables included in the analyses. The 
results indicate that, on average, 43% of the municipalities in a district are represented on 
party lists. With regard to the second dependent variable, the large city candidates get on 
average 28% of the realistic list positions. Put differently, 72% of these positions are allotted 
to other municipalities than the largest city in the district. Another interesting finding is that 
only 24% of the realistic list slots were assigned to women candidates on the average party 
list. In sum, these descriptive results suggest that Belgian parties do realize geographical 
representation on party lists. We now move to the multivariate models to examine which 
party- and electoral system-related mechanisms are at work to ensure this within district 
representation levels. 
< Table 2 about here > 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the results of two fixed effects regression models 
with ܯ݅ and ܴ௜ as dependent variables.
5 Table 2 presents the coefficients of these two models. 
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Model 1 regresses the first indicator ܯ݅ on the independent variables mentioned in Table 2. 
Concerning candidate selection methods, especially decentralization plays a substantial role in 
explaining variation in the level of territorial coverage on party lists. Highly decentralized 
methods, where candidate selection takes place at the district level without any national 
interference, lead to the highest levels of geographical representation. Both the second and 
third category on the decentralization scale have significantly lower proportions of 
municipalities on the candidate list, which is in line with the fourth hypothesis. The results 
with regard to inclusiveness of the selectorate are not that straightforward: the middle 
category, which involves influence of member delegates in candidate selection, yields the 
highest scores on this indicator. The data does not show a clear pattern for the effect of this 
second candidate selection dimension. 
It is clear that the effects of the selectorate and decentralization on the level of geographical 
representation are substantially different. The decentralization dimension seems to play the 
most important role: if parties choose candidate selection methods with influential local party 
branches, then small municipality candidates will get nominated and large city candidates will 
be less dominant. Furthermore, the finding that partially inclusive selection methods with 
party delegates lead to more geographical representation seems to be at odds with earlier 
research (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz, 2008). On the contrary, it confirms the alternative 
argument developed by Kernell (2008) that inclusive selectorates in fact lead to higher levels 
of responsiveness and representation. A high number of selectors means that a large variety of 
interests are represented in candidate selection, which increases the chance that 
representational issues are taken into account when selecting candidates. 
< Table 3 about here > 
As expected, the average number of list slots per municipality has a highly significant positive 
effect on the territorial coverage on party lists. This is a rather straightforward and mechanical 
effect: the more space available on the party list for candidates, the more municipalities in the 
district will have at least one candidate on that list. In addition, the population proportion of 
the largest city in the district has a negative effect on the first indicator of geographical 
representation. This implies that in districts where the largest city is demographically 
dominant, there will be a lower proportion of municipalities represented on party lists. 
Moving on to the fixed-effects coefficients, it is interesting to see that socialist and green 
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parties have comparatively lower levels of geographical representation than their liberal and 
Christian-democratic counterparts.  
Model 2 explains variation in the second indicator ܴ௜, which focuses on the dominance of the 
largest city on realistic list slots. First, the percentage of women candidates in realistic list 
slots seems to be negatively correlated with this indicator. In other words, high levels of 
gender representation lead to higher dominance of large city candidates and consequently 
lower levels of geographical representation in realistic slots. This is in line with H2b, the more 
pessimistic interpretation of the association between different forms of social group 
representation. 
Second, the highly significant effect of the percentage realistic list slots is again very logical: 
if a list has a high number of interesting or eligible list positions, there is more space available 
to allot these positions to candidates from other municipalities than the largest city in the 
district. Third, and analogous to the first model, the population proportion of the largest city 
has a negative impact on the second indicator of geographical representation, which is again 
straightforward. Parties seem to reason that cities which dominate the electoral district in 
terms of population size should dominate the best places on the candidate lists as well. Fourth 
and finally, with regard to the fixed-effects, the results are similar to the first analysis. More 
specifically, socialist and green party lists again score significantly lower on the second 
indicator.6  
None of the models provide support for the first hypothesis, which stated that increased 
district magnitude itself leads to higher levels of geographical representation. Even when the 
list positions variable is removed from the model, there is no significant effect. Again, this 
finding runs counter with the conventional wisdom in the literature that minority groups have 
higher levels of political representation in larger districts. For geographical representation on 
party lists, district magnitude plays a limited role.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide more insight into the dynamics of geographical 
representation on party lists. Based on the relevant literature, I selected a number of 
independent variables which were expected to have an impact on geographical representation 
on the candidate lists of eight Belgian political parties. 
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Some of the results were not particularly surprising. For example, the fact that higher numbers 
of list slots per municipality increases the territorial coverage of party lists is self-evident. The 
same holds for the second analysis, where I found that a higher number of realistic list slots 
leads to a higher level of geographical representation in those positions. In sum, the more 
space is provided on candidate lists, the more parties will take into account geographical 
balance on their list. 
However, if the number of list slots is limited, parties face tough choices in candidate 
selection processes. The results suggest that selectorates are less inclined to geographically 
balance the ticket if the largest city in the district is relatively dominant in terms of population 
size. Local party branches are able to prevent this if they have any form of influence in 
candidate selection processes: the data suggest that highly decentralized candidate selection 
methods lead to party lists with higher levels of geographical representation. This is an 
important finding, as it confirms that ‘territorial decentralization has a positive relationship 
with territorial representation’ (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, p. 118). More specifically, locally 
organized candidate selection guarantees that candidates from both urban and rural areas are 
represented on party lists. This means that parties can counterbalance nationalization and 
centralization tendencies as a result of, for example, electoral reforms by decentralizing their 
candidate selection methods. 
Until now, the literature mainly focused on the effects of selectorate on candidate list 
representation. The more dominant theory is that exclusive selectorates produce party lists 
with higher levels of representation, since they are inclined to think more in terms of the 
common good than inclusive selectorates (Rahat, Hazan, and Katz, 2008; Hazan and Rahat, 
2010). The results do not support this claim, and instead show that the moderately inclusive 
category of party delegates render lists with higher geographical representation. In other 
words, this finding is in line with the competing claim by Kernell (2008) that inclusive 
selectorates are producing party lists with higher levels of representation.  
In any case, there is need for more empirical research on the effects of candidate selection 
methods on party list representation, both in terms of the geographical dimension and other 
demographic candidate characteristics. Moreover, this empirical exercise has proven that 
selectorate and decentralization should be treated as two separate independent variables, not 
only because they are separate analytical dimensions that measure different things, but also 
because they have differential effects on party list representation. Amalgamating these two 
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dimensions in one integrated scale limits our insight into the mechanisms and consequences 
of intraparty candidate selection. 
In addition, the results for the realistic slots support the hypothesis about negative associations 
between different forms of social group representation. More specifically, high percentages of 
women in realistic slots go hand in hand with high numbers of large city candidates, and 
consequently lower levels of geographical representation. Parties that recruit large numbers of 
women for the highest list positions are also inclined to select more candidates from the 
largest city within the district.  
Can these results be generalized, both to other candidate characteristics and to other country 
cases? At the beginning of the paper, I argued that the ticket-balancing dynamics work 
similarly for different types of social representation. To a certain extent, this is true: the 
available list space and party magnitude, operationalized as the percentage of realistic list 
slots, strongly determine geographical representation levels. This confirms that comparable 
mechanisms are at work. However, there are also important differences between the 
geographical dimension and other criteria, such as gender, ethnicity and age representation. 
Geography is the only one of these dimensions that is institutionalized in party structures in 
the form of regional and local party branches. Put differently, organizational incentives for 
geographical ticket-balancing might be comparatively stronger than, for example, the ethnic 
or gender variant.7 
Finally, while Belgium is of course a case with notoriously complex territorial and electoral 
dynamics, I believe that the results of these analyses can, to a certain extent, be generalized to 
comparable flexible list systems. More specifically, the variation in district magnitude and 
candidate selection methods of Belgian parties has been quite substantial over the last 25 
years. This makes Belgium the ideal empirical testing ground for some of the hypotheses 
concerning the effects of electoral system and party attributes on party list representation. 
However, it is generally accepted in the literature that candidate selection dynamics and the 
effects of district magnitude on party- and candidate behavior strongly differ according to 
electoral system type. This creates the need for a more comparative approach in future 
research, including cases from closed and open list systems. 
Acknowledgements 
18 
 
The author would like to thank the Research Foundation Flanders and the Junior Mobility 
Programme of the Flemish Government for their generous support. Furthermore, the author 
would also like to express appreciation for the comments received by Bart Maddens, Yael 
Shomer, Jef Smulders and two anonymous reviewers. An earlier version of the article was 
presented at the general conference of the European Political Science Association in 
Edinburgh, June 19-21, 2014. 
 
About The Author 
Gert-Jan Put is a research fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders, affiliated to the Public 
Governance Institute at the University of Leuven. His research interests include electoral 
systems, candidate selection processes and political representation. E-mail: 
gertjan.put@soc.kuleuven.be 
 
NOTES 
                                                             
1 This is mainly caused by the so-called substitute candidates: a particularity of the Belgian electoral 
system is that voters are presented with a list of effective as well as substitute candidates. These 
substitutes for the elected MPs are also rank ordered on the basis of their preference votes, after the 
distribution of list votes. If an MP becomes member of government, resigns or dies, he or she will be 
replaced by the first substitute. 
2 Candidates for the Lower House do not have to live in the electoral district where they will be 
running for election. In fact, if they are registered in any Belgian municipality on election day at the 
latest, the party selectorate can use them in any district they want. 
3 The only exception are the Flemish greens, who have been out of the Federal Parliament for one 
legislative term (2003-2007).  
4 However, this solution is still problematic if some of the observations in the dependent variable equal 
0 or 1. The logit transformation for these observations will yield undefined values, resulting in missing 
values and consequently a loss of information. To avoid this, I added some noise to the data to ensure 
that 0 < ܴ௜ (or ܯ݅) < 1, and every observation will be included in the multivariate analyses: 
݈݋݃݅ݐ	(ܴ௜) = 	 ln( ܴ௜ + 0.011 − ܴ௜ − 0.01) 
5 The regression coefficients should be interpreted with some caution: since I used a logit 
transformation of ܴ௜ and ܯ݅, the resulting coefficients should be interpreted on the logarithmic scale. 
Although it is possible to back-transform an estimated probability on the logit scale to the probability 
scale, it is not possible to back-transform a regression parameter estimate to the probability scale. 
6 I experimented with adding region as a fixed effect to both models. It did not have any substantial 
effect on the results: in both models, the region dummy was not significant at a 0.05 level and there 
are no significant changes in the R² statistic.  In addition, it did not change any of the other effects 
reported in the tables. 
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7 Of course, some parties also apply some form of social decentralization in their party organization 
and candidate selection methods (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, territorial decentralization 
clearly is the more common form of intraparty decentralization: almost every party will have some 
level of subnational party organization. 
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